Should the death penalty be banned as a form of punishment?

In a Nutshell

Yes

Financial costs to taxpayers of capital punishment is several times that of keeping someone in prison for life.
It is barbaric and violates the "cruel and unusual" clause in the Bill of Rights.
The endless appeals and required additional procedures clog our court system.
We as a society have to move away from the "eye for an eye" revenge mentality if civilization is to advance.
It sends the wrong message: why kill people who kill people to show killing is wrong.
Life in prison is a worse punishment and a more effective deterrent.
Other countries (especially in Europe) would have a more favorable image of America.
Some jury members are reluctant to convict if it means putting someone to death.
The prisoner's family must suffer from seeing their loved one put to death by the state.
The possibility exists that innocent men and women may be put to death.
Mentally ill patients may be put to death.
It creates sympathy for the monsterous perpetrators of the crimes.
It is useless in that it doesn't bring the victim back to life.

The death penalty gives closure to the victim's families who have suffered so much.
It creates another form of crime deterrent.
Justice is better served.
Our justice system shows more sympathy for criminals than it does victims.
It provides a deterrent for prisoners already serving a life sentence.
DNA testing can now effectively eliminate uncertainty as to a person's guilt or innocence.
Prisoner parole or escapes can give criminals another chance to kill.
It gives prosecutors another bargaining chip in the plea bargain process, which is essential in cutting costs in an overcrowded court system.

Pared-down versions of the following decisions are presented in Death Penalty Cases:

· Furman v. Georgia (1972), the landmark ruling invalidating capital punishment laws as then administered, and clearly the watershed case in the modern death-penalty era.

· Gregg v. Georgia (1976), one of a series of important cases in which the justices announced that punishment by death is not per se cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment, and that “guided discretion” statutes are capable of remedying the constitutional infirmities identified by the Furman Court.

· Woodson v. North Carolina (1976), another of the series of 1976 decisions, in which the Court declared mandatory capital-punishment legislation unconstitutional.

· Coker v. Georgia (1977), holding that death is a constitutionally excessive punishment for the crime of raping an adult.

· Enmund v. Florida (1982) and Tison v. Arizona (1987), in which the justices clarified the circumstances under which the “nontrigger-person” in a felony murder can be sentenced to death.

· Stanford v. Kentucky (1989) and Penry v. Lynaugh (1989), ruling, respectively, that the federal Constitution does not prohibit the execution of 16- and 17-year old murderers, or mentally retarded murderers.

· Ford v. Wainwright (1986), recognizing that the Eighth Amendment forbids the capital punishment of offenders who have become “incompetent” for execution, and requiring minimal procedural safeguards for resolving incompetency claims.

· Pulley v. Harris (1984), holding that the federal Constitution does not require “comparative proportionality review” of capital sentences.

· Godfrey v. Georgia (1980), in which a statutory aggravating factor involving the commission of an “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman...” murder was declared unconstitutionally vague, as applied.

· Lockett v. Ohio (1978) and McKoy v. North Carolina (1990), ruling, respectively, that the sentencer in a capital trial must be allowed to consider all relevant mitigating evidence, and that jurors may not be required to agree unanimously that a mitigating factor has been established before crediting mitigation evidence.

· Blystone v. Penn-sylvania (1990), holding that legislation requiring that a death penalty be imposed if the sentencer finds at least one aggravating factor and no mitigating factors, or that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors, does not create an impermissible “mandatory” capital punishment scheme.

· Spaziano v. Florida (1984), approving Florida’s practice of allowing the trial judge to impose a death sentence in disregard of a jury’s advisory verdict recommending a sentence of life imprisonment.

· McCleskey v. Kemp (1987), rejecting equal protection and cruel and unusual punishment challenges to Georgia’s death-penalty system, raised by an African American defendant sentenced to death for murdering a white victim, based on a statewide study suggesting that killers of whites were significantly more likely to be charged with capital crimes and sentenced to death than killers of blacks in otherwise similar cases.

· Payne v. Tennessee (1991), allowing the sentencing authority in capital trials to consider “victim-impact evidence.”

· Burger v. Kemp (1987), rejecting a capital defendant’s claim that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel.

· Arizona v. Rumsey (1984), applying double jeopardy principles to the capital-sentencing context.

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